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Conclusion 
 
All the European countries surveyed here had alien policies based on slightly differing precepts 
that derived from their respective domestic social, economic, and political circumstances. The 
predominance of Liberalism in the nineteenth century and its strictures on the relationship 
between the individual and the state had an impact on alien legislation in all countries 
considered. Resident aliens were considered de facto members of the nation and therefore 
protected against abuses of state power. All other immigrants were granted some protection 
(equality before the law, basic rights), based on the provisions within each state’s constitution, 
but this could go even further for those immigrants who were defined as refugees. 
 During and immediately after the First World War, these policies were adapted, initially 
to exclude unwanted political elements and to meet diplomatic imperatives. In particular, the 
fear of ‘alien’ ideologies such as bolshevism being imported from abroad entailed a loss of 
the liberal protection based on the rights of man. Identifying these ideologies as alien 
reflected the strong push towards nation-building in the early twentieth century as part of the 
integrative revolution in response to the democratisation of politics. Political elites wanted a 
state-community that shared a national identity.  Policy towards aliens was also caught up in 
this integrative policy; imposing on immigrants the duty to assimilate in order to preserve a 
cultural status quo. However, the precise nature of this assimilation was subject of controversy, 
and attempts to homogenize the population or protect an established cultural order produced an 
exclusionary trend which perceived certain ethnic or religious groups as inassimilable.  
 Changes in alien policy during this period were nonetheless still predominantly 
determined by economic interests. Increasing democratisation gave a voice to the previously 
politically disenfranchised and enabled them to oppose state policies that were detrimental to 
what they perceived as their interests. A protectionist immigration policy was one of the 
innovations concomitant with the transformation of the liberal state into a nation-state. 
However, countervailing forces remained. There were the interests of tourism, international 
travel and trade that placed a premium on the free movement of peoples, but most 
importantly the interests of employers who wanted free access to the international labour 
market, but at the same time wanted to recoup their investment in procuring manpower 
abroad. In practice, the turmoil in the years after 1918 was ultimately replaced with more 
relaxed policies before the economic recession of the early 1930s finally convinced each of the 
liberal western European state to reappraise its immigration policies and led to restrictions on 
the admission of immigrants and especially foreign labour.  
The transformation of alien policy that began at the end of the nineteenth century had 
thus two objectives: economic protection, a result of the increasing power of labour within the 
political system, and concerns about national identity that has been dubbed ‘nativism’. In this 
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process, the more ambitious use of alien policy by increasingly interventionist states meant 
that the liberal political culture that had traditionally acted to defend the individual against the 
state lost of its influence. Security measures taken as a result of the First World War 
dramatically changed the operation of pre-war immigration and residence policies, and these 
were seldom completely restored after 1919. From a position of near equality, aliens were 
increasingly excluded from the rights afforded to citizens of these countries.  
 This demise of Liberalism can clearly be seen in changes to policies on refugees. Before 
1914 there had been a general acceptance in liberal states that those who had to flee their 
country for political reasons had to be protected, but after 1918 the right to asylum had all but 
ceased to exist. Refugees arriving at the borders of the liberal states of Europe were now 
habitually dealt with under the terms of the newly erected protectionist immigration policies. 
Russian and Armenian refugees were the first victims of this change in attitude, but thanks to 
the political sympathy aroused by these anti-bolshevist Russians their arrival was no lasting 
problem. Most importantly the need for additional labour in Western Europe at the moment of 
their arrival facilitated their reception.  
Thus, it is important to realise that the arrival of refugees from Nazi Germany after 
January 1933 did not take place in a legislative vacuum, but against a background of existing 
structures, legal precedents and controls. Put another way, nearly all the factors that played 
some role in determining policy during and after 1933 were already in place long before the 
Nazis came to power. No national immigration policies were identical, but two basic models 
can be identified: the British model that emphasized external immigration control, comprising 
border controls and visa schemes, and the Continental model where control was much more 
a mixture of external and internal control. Within the Continental model we can distinguish 
two types: on the one hand the centralized one and on the other the decentralized type 
employed by countries such as Switzerland, Denmark and the Netherlands. In these  latter 
countries, regional and local authorities had considerable influence on the practical 
application of aliens policy that created local variations within these countries.  Another 
important difference within the Continental model was the manner in which undesirable 
immigrants from Central Europe were removed. For example, while France merely obliged 
such people to leave the country on their own initiative, the Belgian authorities physically 
took them to the border and the Dutch formally extradited them to the German authorities. 
These differences in national immigration policies would ultimately have important 
repercussions for the refugees from Nazi Germany.  
On the eve of the refugee crisis of 1933 all countries had the legislative means to deal 
with people coming from Germany, but rapidly realised that practical solutions were difficult 
to enforce. The authorities baulked at expelling ‘Jewish’ and political refugees who had 
entered the countries illegally or whose visas or residence permits had expired. For 
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humanitarian reasons deporting them to Germany was considered unacceptable, while 
passing them on to other states created diplomatic problems. National policies towards 
aliens continued to have many differences, but there was a general strengthening of internal 
controls in the countries of continental Europe that made it increasingly difficult for refugees 
to remain unnoticed or to stand in for their own upkeep. The arrival of ‘Jewish’ refugees played 
a crucial role in this process of restrictionism, but it has to be seen primarily as a continuation of 
the policies adopted to counter the effects of economic recession rather than directed 
specifically against those fleeing from Germany. Thus, while the numbers of people coming 
from Germany between 1933 and the summer of 1935 declined, the climate of increasing 
restrictionism nonetheless continued.  
 In effect, the main determinants of policy in this period remained the custom and practice 
of aliens policy combined with increasing economic nationalism, anti-bolshevism, and (fears of) 
antisemitism. This development has to be seen more as an expression of the increasing power 
of representatives of labour and the middle classes in government, than as a reaction against 
the influx of refugees from Nazi Germany per se. The latter received a great deal of attention in 
the media, out of all proportion to their actual numbers. Their portrayal as a continuous and 
increasing flow of immigrants gave important ammunition to restrictionists who saw Jews (and 
communists) as ‘alien’ to the established cultural boundaries of the nation and undesirable as 
prospective citizens and even a danger to national unity. Although the measures enacted 
affected a much broader constituency, the arrival of the refugees from Germany was an 
important, albeit symbolic, catalyst in the final push for restrictive alien legislation in the later 
1930s.  
In those years there was also a convergence across Western Europe in both policy 
and treatment towards those regarded as refugees. A striking example is the way that 
Belgian and French refugee policies – which had operated on completely different lines in the 
summer of 1933 – had become so similar by the beginning of 1934. Although no Western 
European  country had a legal provision for these fugitives, there was hardly any thought given 
to a blanket exclusion. Switzerland did have an administrative provision for refugees, and she 
was quickly followed by the other liberal states of Western Europe. Traditions of nineteenth 
century liberalism were thus strong enough to force all liberal states to open their borders for 
refugees. The protection of refugees was a principle that liberal states upheld, it was an 
essential element of the national self-image and sections of public opinion could be mobilized 
for its defence. The creation of the ‘refugee’ as an administrative category within immigration 
policy was also the result of refugee resistance to being treated as normal immigrants. 
Refugees were increasingly dissociated from other forms of immigration and more 
benevolently treated. Only a geographically isolated Great Britain was to a large extent able 
to withstand this pressure for change. The British authorities accepted refugees, but they 
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remained in a position to control who was admitted and under what circumstances. This was 
a luxury denied to their continental counterparts who, as frontline states, had to come to 
terms with large numbers of uninvited refugees.  
Crucial in immigration policy was who the authorities defined as refugees. By 1935, 
political and ‘Jewish’ refugees were treated differently in most countries. Political refugees 
were given certain privileges such as longer-term residence status and even permission to 
work, whereas ‘Jews’ were given some form of temporary protection at most. This can be 
explained in part by the fact that political fugitives corresponded more closely to the 
traditional image of a refugee; of people who, because of their political ideas and deeds, had 
suddenly to flee their country to save their life or freedom. Such political refugees had not 
planned their flight and their departure was often in defiance of the authorities in their 
homeland. By force of circumstance they arrived suddenly and empty-handed in a 
neighbouring country. Such (political) refugees also benefited from support given to them 
inside countries of refuge by left-wing political parties. This led to a type of informal refugee 
status being afforded in most liberal states in Continental Europe and a more formal refugee 
status in Switzerland. Western European states continued to give asylum to political refugees 
even when they ignored restrictions placed on their working or engaging in political activities, 
but increasingly relied on prisons and internment camps as a deterrent. In comparative terms 
the Netherlands was definitely the least generous towards political refugees, its leniency 
towards them often only amounted to a choice of frontier over which to be expelled.  
Conversely in both Belgium and France, the entry of socialists into government in the 
mid 1930s gave the impetus for some improved facilities for refugees. In France, concessions 
were limited to an amnesty for all refugees from Nazi Germany present in France in 1936, but 
the French Popular Front government refused to formalize refugee policy for new arrivals. 
Belgium on the other hand joined Switzerland by drawing a clear dividing line between 
refugees and immigrants in immigration policy. Refugees became legally entitled to claim 
asylum. Elsewhere there was an unwillingness to grant a specific legal status to those fleeing 
persecution and policy remained informal and discretionary.  
 Little changed before 1938 and only political activists whose lives or freedom were 
endangered were eligible for asylum. This was the case in Belgium and Switzerland, with a 
formal refugee policy, and in Denmark and France which retained an informal refugee 
regime. These policies had few, if any, effects on those fleeing Germany’s racial anti-
Semitism. The ‘Jewish’ refugees’ reasons for flight were not considered sufficient in themselves 
to accord them a privileged status as ‘refugees’. Although ‘Jews‘ fleeing Nazi Germany are 
nowadays often portrayed as refugees par excellence, before 1938 ‘Jews’ were less visibly 
the victims of state persecution than political activists, and this helps to explain the less 
g`enerous' response.  
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 In 1933 it was possible for ‘Jews’ to arrive from Germany and be treated as regular 
immigrants, provided they could show sufficient means to establish themselves. However, 
increasing German restrictions on the export of goods and currency made this more difficult, 
and the increased imposition of work and business permit legislation meant that only very 
few ‘Jewish’ refugees were able to enter Western European states on this basis. For the vast 
majority, the only option was to arrive in a chosen country of refuge, and then look for 
support from the indigenous Jewish communities or their refugee committees. These 
committees effectively decided who were temporarily protected by granting financial aid. In 
this manner the authorities were able to fulfil their humanitarian ‘obligations’, without incurring 
any financial costs or adding any foreign workers to their labour market. The fact that the 
Jewish organizations provided a possible solution by arranging facilities for their re-
emigration made further concessions unnecessary.  
The political costs of a humanitarian policy towards (‘Jewish’) refugees should not be 
underestimated. Although the authorities made no binding commitments and left a great deal 
of discretion to its administrators, ‘Jewish’ immigration from Nazi Germany was largely 
uncontrolled. Aliens who had arrived illegally or overstayed their permits were not subject to 
expulsion if the Jewish refugee aid committees supported them. These committees therefore 
carried a heavy burden, as they were effectively sub-contracted by the state to make 
decisions and then supported those chosen on a temporary basis while at the same time 
expediting their re-emigration without incurring any costs for the host country. For potential 
refugees, the existence of even temporary protection could be a pull factor. Although the 
design of this informal refugee policy enabled the authorities to reaffirm immigration control 
at any time, it could also convey an impression of loss of control over the country’s frontiers 
and this was often used against governments by political groups seeking to exploit anti-
immigrant sentiment within the population.  
The differential treatment of ‘Jewish’ and political refugees was undermined by the 
radicalization of Nazi antisemitic policy in the aftermath of the Anschluss. At this point, all 
countries had to confront the reality of large numbers of ‘Jews’ arriving at the border or inside 
the country with genuine evidence that their lives might be in danger if they returned to 
Germany. Yet in spite of the overwhelming weight of evidence, refugee policy remained 
largely unaltered and by the summer of 1938, ‘Jewish’ refugees were even encountering 
outright hostility; from consular authorities, at the border and even inside the countries of 
refuge themselves. Most liberal states of Continental Europe started to deport refugees from 
within the country which was the most conspicuous departure from previous policies. That 
refugees who had succeeded in entering the territory of a liberal state and were 
recommended by the local refugee committee for protection were removed by force 
amounted to a challenge of the moral codes of behaviour of these liberal states. France did 
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not follow this trend, even though the French authorities only partly legalised the residence of 
refugees. France seldom physically deported people, but the reception was no more 
welcoming than elsewhere, as in France internment was used as a deterrent. 
The reasons for this rupture in refugee policy were common to all countries. Most 
importantly ‘Jewish’ flight after the Anschluss (with the obvious connivance of German 
authorities) was raging out of control. The arrival of ever more refugees, stripped of their 
possessions convinced the authorities that they should halt further ‘Jewish’ immigration, 
notwithstanding the guarantee of the Jewish committees. This restrictive attitude within 
Continental Europe has to be seen within its international context as it became increasingly 
difficult for those ‘Jewish’ refugees who had been granted provisional asylum in the liberal 
states in Continental Europe to find any country willing to take them as immigrants. While 
numerous states paid lip service to the idea of international negotiation to provide a solution 
to the problem of refugees from Germany and elsewhere, the lack of positive action from the 
Evian Conference in the summer of 1938 demonstrated a complete lack of collective political 
will. Thus the whole issue remained primarily a domestic one, tempered only by its effects on 
relations with Germany on the one hand, and relations with neighbouring states on the other. 
Each European government had to consider the other states’ policy and each of them was 
afraid to become the magnet, implying that the policy of the most restrictive state set the tone. 
The fear of being out of step or too generous triggered pre-emptive actions and produced an 
upward spiral of restriction. 
The illiberal policy of denying ‘Jewish’ refugees any protection was initially legitimized 
by the German policy of dumping. The liberal values which had guided refugee policy until 
then were exchanged for decisiveness in face of this violation of international law. However 
this resolve was only the trigger for a full-blown attack on the temporary protection of ‘Jewish’ 
refugees. The Dutch authorities even blatantly called (non-political) refugees ‘unwanted’, but 
it seems that the Netherlands was quickly surpassed by the other Continental European 
countries who eliminated most humanitarian considerations in daily migration management 
practice. 
The increasing difficulty of denying that ‘Jews’ fleeing Germany were refugees meant 
that the authorities of the liberal countries bordering Nazi Germany preferred to stem the flow 
by border and remote controls; external controls that were largely invisible to the public and 
could be organised through administrative dictat and without scrutiny. Border control was 
strengthened, but it remained dependent on diplomatic considerations. Shortly after the 
Anschluss, several countries executed a straightforward bureaucratic border policy whereby 
insufficiently documented aliens, i.e. ‘Jewish’ refugees without visa, were collectively refused 
admission to the country. Other frontline states were not eager, for the sake of a more effective 
external control to jeopardize their relations with Germany and developed a more 
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personalized system of border control to keep ‘Jewish’ refugees out. Both groups of 
countries had problems in making such a policy work and differentiating between the 
unwanted refugees and the mass of travellers. The introduction of the J-stamp on the 
German passports solved that problem and homogenized, to a large extent, the manner in 
which ‘Jewish’ refugees were routinely refused admission, not only at the borders of the 
liberal states of Western Europe, but also at the desks in their consulates.  
Greater efficiency at the border was not the sole purpose of newly developed 
migration control strategies in the course of 1938. Notwithstanding strengthened and more 
efficient control, the border remained permeable. To counter this defect, states increasingly 
focussed on developing preventive measures outside their national frontiers. This strategy of 
remote control by liberal states aimed to control the movement of refugees before they 
arrived at their borders. The introduction of the J-stamp is a striking example of how liberal 
countries -in this case Switzerland (and Sweden)- were manoeuvring to partly subcontract 
their selective immigration policy to Germany. In trying to re-affirm controls over immigration, 
liberal countries did not eschew even greater complicity with the Nazis. The most conspicuous 
example is that by insisting on German cooperation at the border, Swiss and Belgian authorities 
gave the impetus to the radical shift in German emigration policy in the autumn of 1938 that 
saw the complete cessation of their dumping policy on their Western borders.     
This brutal immigration policy, including the deportation of refugees was enacted 
through instructions issued to government agencies, local border officials and civil servants, 
rather than through new legislation that would have to be discussed, justified and formally 
promulgated. In this way, the executive authorities preserved their complete control of 
migration management; a control they did not want to relinquish as they strove to keep their 
actions away from any public scrutiny. However, when challenged, they were quite prepared 
to legitimise their stance by denying that the ‘Jews’ fleeing Germany were refugees. The 
seemingly persuasive argument was that these ‘Jews’ left Germany with the agreement of 
the German authorities, while (political) refugees had to flee surreptitiously. The liberal states 
of Western Europe, including the Netherlands promoted the protection of the political 
adversaries of the Nazi regime, including the communists, to a fundamental principle in 
liberal migration management. This mantra gave persecuted political activists an entitlement 
to asylum and was the counterweight to the attack on temporary protection for Jewish 
refugees. By 1938 the rigid hierarchy of Nazi persecution employed by Western European 
refugee policy in 1933 was used to deny ‘Jews’ fleeing Germany any protection.   
The violence of the ReichsKristallnacht made it obvious that the Nazi state was at 
least complicit in the persecution of Jews. Switzerland, Luxemburg and Denmark, (although 
the latter was hardly exposed to migratory pressures) persisted in routine exclusionary 
practices at the border, but also in the countries themselves. Most people in need of 
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protection remained excluded. In contrast, Belgium and the Netherlands softened the 
application of regulations which had dehumanized their immigration policies. In November 
1938 the Netherlands reaffirmed its solidarity with the ‘Jewish’ victims of Nazi persecution, 
but only a month later the Dutch authorities considered that the sheer numbers admitted 
could no longer be sustained. Although the Dutch had followed the French example by 
confining refugees in camps, this was not considered a sufficient deterrent. Deportation of 
‘Jewish’ refugees became again official Dutch policy, although this policy was full of 
ambiguity. During 1939 the Netherlands equivocated between a policy of forcible deportation 
and legalization. Belgium, which in November 1938 resumed the policy of protecting ‘Jewish’ 
refugees by subcontracting large elements of internal immigration control to the aid 
committees, did not stop this until the outbreak of the Second World War. This consistency 
was the result of an assertive humanitarian lobby, expressing itself most virulently at the 
moment of the ReichsKristallnacht and galvanized by a Minister in charge of immigration 
policy who had provocatively defended his inhumane ‘realpolitik’. This coincidence of factors 
meant that internal migration control moved out of the closed forums of Belgian policy 
making and into the public arena. This outspoken politicisation of immigration policy meant 
that the influx of refugees could not be downgraded to a technical matter of migration control 
and the political elite had to take a watchful public into account.  
Notwithstanding the existence of an institutionalized refugee policy, even in Belgium 
the relative merits of the politically and racially persecuted were still evaluated differently: 
while political refugees were granted a right of abode, ‘Jewish’ refugees were denied refugee 
status.  ‘Jews’ from Germany remained ‘only’ temporarily protected as part of an informal 
refugee policy. Administrative discretion was preserved and the concessions to (‘Jewish’) 
refugees could be withdrawn. Concomitant with this dual refugee policy, the Belgian 
authorities also pressurised the German authorities to regulate cross-border traffic in line with 
existing agreements. These diplomatic initiatives underline the Janus-faced attitude of the 
Belgian authorities towards those fleeing Nazi Germany. Publicly all refugees were granted 
asylum, but ‘Jewish’ refugees received a lesser asylum and at the same time the Belgian 
authorities secretly tried to convince the Germans to keep their ‘Jewish’ persecutees ‘at 
home’. The latter strategy of pressurizing the German authorities to stop unauthorized 
immigration into their territory could also be seen in Switzerland, but was totally absent in 
Denmark and the Netherlands, countries which refrained from anything that could annoy its 
powerful neighbour.   
The continental European liberal states had to deal with refugees who simply 
appeared inside its frontiers, but in contrast, Britain could develop a refugee policy without a 
similar pressing need to respond to the asylum claims of uninvited guests. After 
ReichsKristallnacht the British authorities made a conscious decision to offer asylum to 
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people in danger in Germany and their intervention in offering a solution to a considerable 
number of victims was a clear departure from past policies. It remained an informal refugee 
policy financed by charitable sources, but private sponsors obtained considerably more 
leeway. Britain, as not being a country of first asylum and moreover protected by the North 
Sea, retained the ability to impose a pre-selection of the refugees she admitted. Still it seems 
that those few who managed to arrive in the country illegally were treated in a humane 
manner as there is no evidence of any direct repatriation to Nazi Germany. Outside Europe 
no country developed a similar pro active refugee policy, on the contrary national 
protectionism held sway and refugees from Nazi Germany were usually the least welcome 
immigrants. Re-emigration from the first countries of asylum stalled, posing a problem for 
Britain and even more so for the frontline states which were left with an increasing number of 
uninvited and destitute refugees from Germany.  
 
Explaining different refugee and immigration policies  
 
In making direct comparisons between these western European states, it is apparent that 
their national policies towards aliens in general and refugees in particular differed in 1933 
and remained at variance throughout the 1930s. The evolution of policy in the liberal states 
of Western Europe was dependent on a myriad of factors. The historical legacy is clearly the 
most obvious element, involving as it does increasing state intervention in matters of 
immigration. The administrative structures of the state also had a direct influence on the 
development and execution of immigration policy and on the stances taken on the question 
of refugees in all countries. There were several other factors which had a direct, and perhaps a 
crucial influence on the development and execution of immigration policy and on the stances 
taken on the question of refugees in all countries. The first was the role of the civil service in 
general and key individuals in particular. To some extent the arrival of refugees from Germany 
after 1933 prompted fears in bureaucratic circles about the perceived lack of control over 
immigration. This can be seen against the background of growing concern during the inter-war 
period about the general efficiency of government and its various agencies. All of this led to a 
continuing pressure for rules and regulations to be tightened in order to provide the civil 
servants with the necessary tools to carry out their tasks efficiently. Alongside this, it is essential 
to consider the role of key individuals in all countries whose specific position gave them a pivotal 
role in determining how individual states responded to the refugees and to immigration 
generally. It could be argued that men such as Robert de Foy, Heinrich Rothmund and Eigil 
Thune Jacobsen were all part of a new technocratic breed, basing their thinking on the precepts 
suggested above. However fears about the (Jewish and communist) refugees can clearly be 
seen in their writings of de Foy and Rothmund, suggesting that they also espoused deeply 
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conservative opinions that were brought to bear on their work.  Irrespective of this, their central 
role in the administration of border control, policing and the execution of admissions policy gave 
them enormous power in being able to instruct their subordinates on the one hand and to 
influence cabinet ministers through the provision of information and advice on the other. The 
role of key individuals and the administration thus has to be evaluated by positioning them 
within the power structures of both state and society. The Belgian case documents the 
importance of retaining a broad picture of decision-making on this issue. Here, refugee policy 
became an issue of public importance in the autumn of 1938 and from then onwards, the 
responsible government Ministers were afraid of a negative political backlash if more 
selective refugee policies were introduced. Thus Robert de Foy in Belgium had to bow to 
political opposition, while his Swiss counterpart, Heinrich Rothmund, did not. Likewise in 
Luxemburg and Denmark, immigration policy remained largely isolated from public scrutiny 
and refugee policy largely evaporated in a process of tightened immigration policy.   
It is important to underline the different ways in which policy was carried out. At one 
level, it is clear that legislation against aliens was not always fully implemented, or that there 
was a tacit understanding that some of its provisions would not be employed. Thus, there might 
be implicit toleration of people who, under a strict interpretation of the law, should have been 
expelled. At another level, it is also clear that the structures and systems in all countries 
provided a degree of autonomy, both for civil servants and the judiciary, and also for local 
officials. Centralization appears to have been greatest in Belgium and Luxembourg. In 
Denmark and the Netherlands, policy implementation was far more decentralized and 
allowed greater scope for the autonomy of regional or local officials, while during the 1930s, 
Switzerland shifted further towards the Belgian model with questions of residence being 
added to border control and admissions policies that were already the responsibility of the 
federal government. These administrative structures undoubtedly served to influence policy-
making in a number of ways. For example, civil servants’ autonomy to act independently of 
political influences or public opinion may have served either to strengthen the enforcement of 
regulations, or equally to have provided some amelioration of these same regulations. These 
freedoms, which undoubtedly varied from one country to another and also over time, may help 
to explain why it is so difficult to ascertain exactly how alien and immigration policies were 
implemented, at the border or by the police and bureaucrats inside the country. 
 Last, but not least we should also mention the refugees themselves. The refugees were 
not merely passive victims, but also agents of their own destiny and their collective actions 
also influenced the aliens policy of the liberal states. The responses were highly interactive, 
as the closing of one border deflected refugees towards other borders. Empirical indications 
point that out. For example it is at the time when Switzerland closed its borders to Austrian 
Jews that emigration to the Benelux soared. This interactivity among asylum applicants of 
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various countries is still a largely neglected subject. Further research  needs to refine the 
correlation between the direction of flight, German emigration policy and West European 
immigration policies. To have a clear picture of this, it is essential to see how individual 
decisions coupled with the agency of the various indigenous and international refugee aid 
groups framed the ways in which Western European states tackled this most intractable of 
problem of the 1930s.  
The open-ended situation at the outbreak of the Second World War is testimony of 
the quandary in which the policy makers in Western Europe found themselves. They were 
fully aware of Nazi persecution taking place within Germany and therefore carry some 
responsibility for the failures in maintaining their supposedly liberal values. However this 
responsibility is a shared one. When the situation in Germany became more and more acute, 
policy makers in countries outside Europe also tightened their immigration policy and refused 
to relieve the frontline states of their burden. Although increasing restrictions was always an 
attractive option, especially when the Nazis systematically stripped the refugees of all their 
possessions, the very different choices made in the various (frontline) states demonstrates 
that the outcome was by no means preordained. Respect for human rights remained a value 
that could be mobilized in political struggles, within the political elite and within society at 
large.  
The sovereign right of the state to refuse an individual entry to its territory, even if he 
or she was identified as a refugee, was seldom ever contested. Once refugees crossed the 
frontier they were no longer merely emigrants, but became asylum applicants to whom 
national norms could be applied. This normative dimension in immigration policy was only 
partly the result of internationally agreed norms. The international refugee regime was 
accepted only by some of the liberal states, and in any case imposed few obligations on the 
immigration policies. Likewise national refugee regimes failed to enforce a humanitarian 
policy towards the mass of refugees. Even the agencies in Belgium and Switzerland in 
charge of immigration policy argued that the protection afforded to the (political) refugees 
was not applicable to the mass of ‘Jewish’ refugees. Yet even when Western European 
states resorted to the deportation of  ‘Jewish’ refugees, they still had to legitimise this to 
liberal public opinion and the various aid and charitable organisations involved. Knowledge of 
such deportations often sparked off protests and their strength served to some extent to 
determine subsequent refugee policy. The liberal values, of which granting asylum to 
refugees was an intrinsic part, were only mobilized against a state when it used its coercive 
powers inside its own borders, but there was little or no protest against inhumane measures 
carried out in the form of external controls. The relevant authorities realized this all too well 
and therefore maintained their preference for external control exercised well away from 
domestic public scrutiny.  
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The liberal frontline states seem to have been most successful in keeping out refugees only 
with the most draconian of policies against aliens. Thus only when forced repatriation was 
used to return those who had managed to enter illegally via the green frontiers was the 
migration pressure relieved. Even then, the real effectiveness of these policies remains open 
to question, but it did relieve the authorities of any responsibility for differentiating the 
refugees from the rest among these uninvited guests. By including refugees in the category 
of undocumented aliens who could be automatically deported, immigration procedures 
became more efficient, but this inevitably made it more difficult for the Western European 
states to keep up the appearance of being liberal regimes in every sense of the word.  
 
